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Parity Finance

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Executive Summary
Summary of Findings
Assessment Breakdown
Scope
Operational Considerations
Key Actors and Capabilities
Findings 8Expand
Auditor Suggestions 3Expand
Appendix
Toolset
Automated Analysis
Test Suite Results
Changelog
About Quantstamp

Executive Summary

This audit report was prepared by Quantstamp, the leader in blockchain security.

Type
Stablecoin, Staking
Timeline
2024-08-19 through 2024-09-10
Language
Rust
Methods
Architecture Review, Unit Testing, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review
Specification
Parity
Source Code
Auditors
  • Danny Aksenov Senior Auditing Engineer
  • Nikita Belenkov Auditing Engineer
  • Mustafa Hasan Senior Auditing Engineer
Documentation quality
Medium
Test quality
Medium
Total Findings
8
Fixed: 7Acknowledged: 1
High severity findingsInfo icon
High-severity issues usually put a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or are reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for client's reputation or serious financial implications for client and users.
0
Medium severity findingsInfo icon
Medium-severity issues tend to put a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental for the client's reputation if exploited, or are reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
1
Fixed: 1
Low severity findingsInfo icon
The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
4
Fixed: 4
Undetermined severity findingsInfo icon
The impact of the issue is uncertain.
1
Fixed: 1
Informational findingsInfo icon
The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
2
Fixed: 1Acknowledged: 1

Summary of Findings

This audit report, prepared by Quantstamp, provides a security assessment of the Parity Finance stablecoin and staking programs. Overall, we found that the code is well-written, follows best practices, and is structured in a clear and maintainable way. Importantly, we did not identify any critical security vulnerabilities during the audit.

While the codebase is robust, there is room for improvement, particularly in the area of testing. We recommend increasing the depth and breadth of the testing framework to include edge cases that will ensure the system’s reliability across a wider range of scenarios.

Please note that in this audit, QS has focused on the security of smart contracts and the governance processes of the protocol but has not explicitly assessed the particular investment strategies employed by Parity Finance.

Update:

The Parity Finance team has resolved all identified issues from the audit, fixing the medium and low-severity findings with improved validation and checks. Informational issues were either addressed or acknowledged as intentional design choices. These updates have made improvements on the protocol's security and reliability. For further improvements, we recommend the team continue to improve their testing scope and coverage to ensure more robust and comprehensive resilience against further potential edge cases.

IDDescriptionSeverityStatus
PAR-1State-Account Balance Discrepancies in Token Management
MediumInfo icon
Medium-severity issues tend to put a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental for the client's reputation if exploited, or are reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
Fixed
PAR-2Missing Validation of Mint Address
LowInfo icon
The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Fixed
PAR-3Overwriting Pending Withdrawal Amount
LowInfo icon
The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Fixed
PAR-4Double Accounting in Current Slot Volume
LowInfo icon
The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Fixed
PAR-5Insufficient Input Validation Across Multiple Contract Functions
LowInfo icon
The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Fixed
PAR-6Missing Validation for base_mint account
InformationalInfo icon
The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
Acknowledged
PAR-7Potential Inconsistency in Deposit Cap Update
InformationalInfo icon
The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
Fixed
PAR-8Inconsistent Admin Authority Checks in Token Management Functions
UndeterminedInfo icon
The impact of the issue is uncertain.
Fixed

Assessment Breakdown

Quantstamp's objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices.

Alert icon
Disclaimer

Only features that are contained within the repositories at the commit hashes specified on the front page of the report are within the scope of the audit and fix review. All features added in future revisions of the code are excluded from consideration in this report.

Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

  • Transaction-ordering dependence
  • Mishandled exceptions
  • Unsafe external calls
  • Integer overflow / underflow
  • Number rounding errors
  • Seed collisions
  • Arbitrary CPI
  • Type cosplay
  • Account reloading
  • Denial of service / logical oversights
  • Access control
  • Centralization of power
  • Business logic contradicting the specification
  • Code clones, functionality duplication
  • Missing account validation
  • Appropriate ownership checks
  • Arbitrary token minting
  • Proper account initialization
  • Proper account closing

Methodology

  1. Code review that includes the following
    1. Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
    2. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
    3. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp describe.
  2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
    1. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
    2. Symbolic execution, which is analyzing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
  3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarity, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
  4. Specific, itemized, and actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Scope

During the audit, we reviewed the parity-issuance and parity-staking programs at commit 9eee7b5f08dfde09693467fa2facf55fe4c623c1. At the time, work on pt-staking was ongoing and was subsequently reviewed at commit 1acb18214404cec647e3d91201ed932ee96f93aa.

Files Included

Repo: https://github.com/Parity-Finance/parity-contracts/tree/main/programs(9eee7b5f08dfde09693467fa2facf55fe4c623c1)

Files:

  • programs/parity-issuance/*
  • programs/parity-staking/*


Repo: https://github.com/Parity-Finance/parity-contracts/tree/main/programs(1acb18214404cec647e3d91201ed932ee96f93aa)
Files:

  • programs/pt-staking/*

Operational Considerations

  1. Race conditions surrounding updating deposit cap via update_pool_manager() and stake().
  2. The hard-coded 1:1 exchange rate in the Issuance program could create arbitrage opportunities and potential abuse by the protocol's users if either PUSD or USDC depegs.
  3. The Parity protocol interacts with centralized exchanges (CEXs), resulting in the fact that not all reserve management operations are fully visible on-chain. However, according to the provided documentation, Parity is committed to ensuring transparency in its CEX-based operations as well.
  4. The minting functionality in the Parity Issuance program restricts minting and redemption of tokens to whitelisted users, based on a provided Merkle tree. PUSD, a permissionless token, is primarily acquired by users through secondary market transactions on decentralized exchanges (DEXs). While we appreciate Parity's implementation of the whitelist feature for enhancing security and compliance, we believe it also introduces some additional operational complexity for Parity.

Key Actors And Their Capabilities

Owner

  • Can transfer ownership
  • Can update admin
  • Can update Minter(Stake Pool address which is allowed to mint PUSD without depositing USDC into the pool)
  • Can update emergency fund basis point (% of USDC backing PUSD that always has to stay in the program for redemptions)
  • Can update withdrawTimelock (time in seconds after which an initiated withdraw can be executed)
  • Can update WithdrawExecutionTime (time in seconds after withdrawal becomes available it expires again)
  • Update Metadata of stablecoin token
  • Update metadata of xMint
  • Controlled by a Fireblocks multi-sig wallet

Admin

  • Can grant/revoke Minter, Redeemer, Gatekeeper roles
  • Can set the mintLimitPerSlot .
  • Can set the redeemLimitPerSlot .
  • Can withdraw and deposit USDC into the Issuance Pool
  • Can update the yield_rate of the staking contract
  • Controlled by a Fireblocks multi-sig wallet

Gatekeepers

  • Can disable mint/redeem functionality,
  • Maximum 5 Wallets

Minter/Redeemer:

  • Can invoke Mint and Redeem instruction from the issuance program
  • Checked with a merkle-tree allowlist that can be updated by the Admin role
  • No limit of potential wallets

Findings

PAR-1  

State-Account Balance Discrepancies in Token Management

MediumInfo icon
Medium-severity issues tend to put a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental for the client's reputation if exploited, or are reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: eef2a9b27809735afdc7c1b1992cf111f01d26ff. The client provided the following explanation:

Use vault ata balance for any checks

Alert icon
Update

The client added additional instructions to withdraw excess funds in the following commits: f222fd42c7099f1cd159606e4dec53f98185a489 and 5e1cf25bf8606896a29d56af0d4a98821fb61d09.

File(s) affected: programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/deposit_funds.rs, programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/withdraw_funds.rs, programs/parity-staking/src/instructions/unstake.rs, programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/initialize_withdraw_funds.rs

Description: The parity-issuance and parity-staking programs effectively track certain token-related changes locally in state variables such as total_collateral and base_balance. While there is nothing inherently wrong with tracking these values for program logic, they should not be relied upon as the authoritative source of truth for the actual token balances in vault accounts.

Discrepancies may occur because users can transfer tokens directly to vaults, resulting in a mismatch between the tracked state and the actual vault balance. For example:

  1. deposit_funds.rs and withdraw_funds.rs: The total_collateral field is updated locally in the token_manager account, but this value may diverge from the actual vault balance if tokens are transferred directly to the vault.

  2. unstake.rs: The base_balance field in the pool_manager account is updated via a local variable, but it may not accurately reflect the true balance of the vault.

  3. initialize_withdraw_funds.rs: Withdrawal validations are performed using the stored total_collateral value instead of the actual balance in the token account.

While local state tracking is beneficial for efficiency and logic within the program, it is important to recognize that these values do not always reflect the real-time balance of vaults and should not be considered definitive for account balances.

Recommendation: Ensure there is a clear distinction between the local state variables used for tracking operations and the actual vault balances. The program logic should be explicit in its use of these values, and where critical operations like withdrawals are involved, consider validating against the real-time token account balance to prevent potential discrepancies

PAR-2  

Missing Validation of Mint Address

LowInfo icon
The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: 5df982ba4ce4744d743d0a62f02962a903a45111. The client provided the following explanation:

Fixed

File(s) affected: programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/withdraw_funds.rs

Description: The mint account in the WithdrawFunds struct lacks proper validation of its address. This allows an admin to pass in any mint account with an inflated supply, potentially bypassing withdrawal limits.

Recommendation: Implement a check to ensure that the mint account's address matches the one associated with the token_manager.

PAR-3  

Overwriting Pending Withdrawal Amount

LowInfo icon
The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: 81d727551aa4a827bca8ed5f14f3dcdc76048577, 541dc61daefc7903d5ee779beadc24e3e566dfaa. The client provided the following explanation:

Can only be overwritten once it's no longer valid

File(s) affected: programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/initialize_withdraw_funds.rs

Description: If a withdrawal is initiated twice before the first one is processed, the second one would overwrite the first one's pending withdrawal amount.

Recommendation: Implement a check to ensure there's no existing pending withdrawal before initiating a new one. Alternatively, consider using a queue system for multiple pending withdrawals.

PAR-4  

Double Accounting in Current Slot Volume

LowInfo icon
The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: 6436fb946ceb197d4b5cb6f10e34d32983fc1134. The client provided the following explanation:

Double accounting resolved

File(s) affected: programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/mint.rs, programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/redeem.rs

Description: When a new slot is encountered, the current_slot_volume is updated twice: once in the check_block_limit function and again at the end of the handler function. This could lead to incorrect accounting of the current slot volume.

Recommendation: Review the logic for updating current_slot_volume. Ensure it's only updated once per transaction, preferably at the end of the handler function after all checks and operations have been completed successfully.

PAR-5  

Insufficient Input Validation Across Multiple Contract Functions

LowInfo icon
The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: 26fd1c8857c89f5df53f0211c95331af6672d1e4, eb8c7ba08595b975a606bfc913a1bb72b5c30bee. The client provided the following explanation:

Added several input validations as recommended

File(s) affected: programs/pt-staking/src/instructions/pt_stake.rs, programs/pt-staking/src/instructions/initialize_global_config.rs, programs/pt-staking/src/instructions/update_global_config.rs, programs/parity-staking/src/instructions/update_pool_manager.rs, programs/parity-staking/src/instructions/initialize_pool_manager.rs, programs/parity-staking/src/instructions/unstake.rs, programs/pt-staking/src/instructions/pt_unstake.rs, programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/initialize_token_manager.rs, programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/mint.rs, programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/update_token_manager_owner.rs, programs/parity-staking/src/instructions/update_annual_yield.rs

Description: Several functions across the parity-contracts codebase lack comprehensive input validation for critical parameters. This includes missing checks for non-zero values, absence of bounds validation for numerical inputs such as fees, and lack of verification for account authorities and states. The affected areas span various operations such as staking, unstaking, minting, configuration updates, and token management.

Several explicit examples:

  1. parity_staking doesn't check if the quantity is 0 in the following functions

    1. stake()
    2. unstake()

  2. pt_staking doesn't check if the quantity is 0 in the following functions

    1. pt_stake()
    2. pt_unstake()

  3. parity_issuance doesn't check if the quantity is 0 in the following functions:

    1. deposit_funds()
    2. withdraw_funds()
    3. mint_admin()
    4. mint()
    5. redeem()

Recommendation: Implement thorough input validation for all user-supplied parameters and critical values throughout the contract. This should include:

  1. Ensuring non-zero values where appropriate (e.g., stake and unstake quantities)
  2. Implementing bounds checks for numerical inputs (e.g., deposit caps, fee rates)
  3. Validating account authorities and states before allowing sensitive operations
  4. Adding checks for reasonable ranges and constraints specific to each parameter
  5. Verifying the integrity and correctness of input data structures

PAR-6  

Missing Validation for base_mint account

InformationalInfo icon
The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
Acknowledged
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:

Smart Contracts can be standalone

File(s) affected: programs/pt-staking/src/instructions/initialize_global_config.rs

Description: The base_mint account in the InitializeGlobalConfig struct is not validated. This could potentially allow the contract to be initialized with an incorrect or malicious mint account.

Recommendation: Add constraints to the base_mint account to ensure it is the correct token mint account.

PAR-7  

Potential Inconsistency in Deposit Cap Update

InformationalInfo icon
The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: 878ad5617d4dcaef89c3a3cecef5e4751f6619b5, 47dc0ad6073a640b34f40d94dab82231996cb9b1. The client provided the following explanation:

Deposit cap can't be set below currently deposited amount

File(s) affected: programs/pt-staking/src/instructions/update_global_config.rs

Description:  The new_deposit_cap can be set to a value less than the existing deposit amount in the vault account, potentially leading to inconsistencies.

Recommendation: Implement a check to ensure that the new deposit cap is not less than the current total deposits in the vault.

PAR-8  

Inconsistent Admin Authority Checks in Token Management Functions

UndeterminedInfo icon
The impact of the issue is uncertain.
Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: e56ba9cdaf5e7be03f2678a2cda9bc2539100935. The client provided the following explanation:

Role management fixed as advised

File(s) affected: programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/add_gatekeeper.rs, programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/remove_gatekeeper.rs, programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/update_token_manager_admin.rs

Description: Several token management functions in the parity-issuance program exhibit inconsistencies between the implemented admin checks and the documented behavior. Specifically, these functions are using token_manager.owner for admin verification, while the documentation states that token_manager.admin should be responsible for these operations. This discrepancy affects the following functions:

  1. Adding gatekeepers
  2. Removing gatekeepers
  3. Updating token manager admin

Recommendation: To resolve this inconsistency, implement one of the following solutions:

  1. Update the admin checks in all affected functions to use token_manager.admin instead of token_manager.owner. This aligns the code with the current documentation and ensures that the intended admin account has the proper authority.

  2. If the current implementation using token_manager.owner is intentional, update the documentation to accurately reflect this behavior. Clearly state that the owner, not the admin, is responsible for these token management operations.

Auditor Suggestions

S1  

Using empty_merkle_root as a Flag for No Restrictions Is Not a Good Practice

Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: 86cb8efa19d5049bb85af857fac4ed0f10901927. The client provided the following explanation:

Another bool flag added

Alert icon
Update

The client did add a bool flag in commit 86cb8efa19d5049bb85af857fac4ed0f10901927. However there is currently no update functionality for this mechanism.

Alert icon
Update

The client added the ability to update the boolean in commit 377e68e1a2459556085d19f1d8bfaf8f2d6cbefe.

File(s) affected: programs/parity-issuance/src/state.rs

Description: Currently a Merkle root is used to indicate if a whitelist is present for the token minting. If the Merkle root is empty, hence self.merkle_root == empty_merkle_root, then there is no whitelist, and all addresses are allowed to mint. This could be easily confused with a whitelist being present and the Merkle root not being set yet.

Recommendation: Consider using a different flag to signify that whitelisting is in place.

S2  

Code Improvements

Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: 81d727551aa4a827bca8ed5f14f3dcdc76048577. The client provided the following explanation:

Was resolved within other fixes

File(s) affected: programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/update_token_manager_owner.rs, programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/initialize_withdraw_funds.rs

Description: The following improvements can be made to further the code quality:

  1. In the update_token_manager_owner instruction, the line reading token_manager.withdraw_execution_window = withdraw_execution_window lacks a semi colon towards the end, which may result in a premature function return if the two values being set after this point should be set.
  2. In the initialize_withdraw_funds instruction, the quote_amount > token_manager.total_collateral check is unnecessary since the amount is later on checked against the output of calculate_max_withdrawable_amount().

Recommendation: Add the function implementation if this feature is required. Remove the function and the respective remove_gatekeeper.rs file in the instructions directory otherwise.

S3  

Consider Having an Updatable Exchange Rate for Minting

Fixed
Alert icon
Update

Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: 4e7cafad97890fa54136ab7ce6edf5310fef39b4. The client provided the following explanation:

Added functionality to change exchange rate later

File(s) affected: programs/parity-issuance/src/instructions/update_token_manager_owner.rs

Description: Currently, there is a set exchange rate between the quote token and the base token that is being minted. This exchange rate is set at creation and can not be updated.

Recommendation: Consider if it would be useful to be able to update this exchange rate without the need to redeploy the contract.

Definitions

  • High severity – High-severity issues usually put a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or are reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for client's reputation or serious financial implications for client and users.
  • Medium severity – Medium-severity issues tend to put a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental for the client's reputation if exploited, or are reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
  • Low severity – The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
  • Informational – The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
  • Undetermined – The impact of the issue is uncertain.
  • Fixed – Adjusted program implementation, requirements or constraints to eliminate the risk.
  • Mitigated – Implemented actions to minimize the impact or likelihood of the risk.
  • Acknowledged – The issue remains in the code but is a result of an intentional business or design decision. As such, it is supposed to be addressed outside the programmatic means, such as: 1) comments, documentation, README, FAQ; 2) business processes; 3) analyses showing that the issue shall have no negative consequences in practice (e.g., gas analysis, deployment settings).

Appendix

File Signatures

The following are the SHA-256 hashes of the reviewed files. A file with a different SHA-256 hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. You are cautioned that a different SHA-256 hash could be (but is not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of the review.

Files

  • 1d1...49f ./error.rs
    1d1997febdc71158c3b1201daa08d1e8a8e716fa5fd9d2da36652050d68b149f
  • ba0...e63 ./lib.rs
    ba0746f50e78518e1064f80fe042230d35965317ecd8a12bf76e6fce71f06e63
  • c18...80f ./state.rs
    c186b1f6d4e62dad45b16aef79d4e89935aac6f7f4eab1deff6153d60781c80f
  • 72e...227 ./init_pt_stake.rs
    72e8737edf5d43c20902595d3af01faf6211491368133e2f8875ffa8d82fa227
  • bf9...002 ./initiate_update_global_config_owner.rs
    bf92884e0648d52dc5faecc5ab2c41b2b9b15c8f056c01427d968b337a044002
  • 3fc...5ea ./update_global_config.rs
    3fce6a0635f63e40246f25753bef2897825d59cb2cfd83f659239893534295ea
  • ce8...4b3 ./mod.rs
    ce85c11ea112002b9f96a10ed6a455e92cd0e74ae6054b9ee48ffd269c9784b3
  • fd6...ca1 ./update_global_config_owner.rs
    fd6b1aacc5aa30907cc57d17546caf1d4f5de96379aaa8529d28abffe31bfca1
  • 5e0...10e ./pt_unstake.rs
    5e05f23b7789e943507fccd8836dd2538e26f931a6609ebc136c8042fee1110e
  • 81f...463 ./pt_stake.rs
    81fee093968074ad16f91ecd76e0ff15a044dcbc580b247e018cba122e1e8463
  • 505...027 ./initialize_global_config.rs
    5055927b946a2d40929aae4af75eac80a11502538f1089bf4c193f784bb6e027
  • e3d...969 ./error.rs
    e3db30e73f08930308df75839796dd661461965eaaa6310410aff241f6a8a969
  • c52...cbb ./lib.rs
    c52052e5450c249f13acba86ee27c4394bcd4b04d9a1f041f2dcb1b94841ccbb
  • ad8...909 ./state.rs
    ad8caad55f3908a4d675767636a0c34639f9ce5d3f3795bf75fc27c05d488909
  • 5d1...0e1 ./u64x64_math.rs
    5d15ffb29dd674c1a07ae91a363f9be2d72301c6f3d5d4a13afb1c62631c70e1
  • e50...92a ./initialize_pool_manager.rs
    e500b636f6206d73e60a4c6b3e5d617af47caa70c21eff59c8fdadaee122f92a
  • 9ba...e9a ./update_annual_yield.rs
    9ba079fe24da668f875f82131037df785f1d1fb462ccdb3d86d57c8fc7518e9a
  • 159...93b ./stake.rs
    159b44c0009bc1b6a8ca00e74643b75f4e1f1e6fffc7e93b0bce6004f853a93b
  • 39b...679 ./update_xmint_metadata.rs
    39b0f6081ab808525180090a95d6fdaf625e0931cb49145981e91d09adc23679
  • 4f3...b50 ./initiate_update_pool_owner.rs
    4f36830c6d521bc0dc82e9c5e6a8439bba3ee0e1a5a579587ed90ced33556b50
  • cb0...9ce ./mod.rs
    cb0898b003ff7bb2b98e78525ce8999f3511df29d5b77cc4f28aa1cd02d609ce
  • 61c...74c ./update_pool_manager.rs
    61cb8aaf490ed6117f75a2e1a690a0d8df21c6217024f8d2d55df65eb2bc974c
  • 931...1dd ./unstake.rs
    931d27b1bf12a9ba1a18b5d5676afa3adea474e9726b7fa9fc84ac397b6901dd
  • e5e...857 ./update_pool_owner.rs
    e5ec15082f6f17ea46d45d27f53508d73602285f468f1afaaaf499d826c24857
  • 929...4a9 ./parity-issuance/src/error.rs
    92986fb189b52d2d20da4436afe5b9cf3a363eee8cc8dc60ce71be0270c484a9
  • cac...d98 ./parity-issuance/src/lib.rs
    cac1bc7a4135166d209491d2be0cd52c874f3a4ce7694b5eb0866278bfbe6d98
  • c39...1fb ./parity-issuance/src/state.rs
    c39ee6c72f68ea75854c0c060c2336f00ade6837a5db8c4c9597621a50aed1fb
  • ce1...48b ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/update_token_manager_owner.rs
    ce1091bca40f109e9f1400935958e2ce510417317b492e7c7cdb70401102b48b
  • e49...c67 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/remove_gatekeeper.rs
    e494199333d1d60b98c1a48afb425c5b8967795b6a829c528156ab46c84b2c67
  • 9f3...d31 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/add_gatekeeper.rs
    9f3a8e910e8412450e27f3828c6aec39035bd0b018513a0675fded8827a17d31
  • f48...a22 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/toggle_active.rs
    f48497401ba7a349a59b8bac01527e55491ce6e3e2d88d981402c21ed968da22
  • 3fb...9da ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/initialize_withdraw_funds.rs
    3fbf43b4898f26566868ee202cb540d0f0ab5a89642174db96b2e393474189da
  • e1f...163 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/deposit_funds.rs
    e1f9f3c4d30e48b8bd00e709781610f2cc556c01b2da6af44e94c4589e00b163
  • 1bc...07c ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/redeem.rs
    1bcf7cdea3ecc8b4cb8cb36716b43a22e50add48bbd9758a1e67f33ef47d407c
  • 79f...a25 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/update_mint_metadata.rs
    79f3283a6d75e71950c6b9075f7f338bad427403857cfda8e6aa3aaa97b07a25
  • d7c...f29 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/mint_admin.rs
    d7cde061f9c9e5244ab8d349a75386e9736a2c79fad10b00435bfc3d4bdfcf29
  • a11...994 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/update_manager_owner.rs
    a11f1aa905678a868fb4ffb1fc2832fb7b4938b4b93a06844dcfd3ae1d70e994
  • f64...8eb ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/mod.rs
    f643b5bf8a33589b6bf7c440df01c0980da45315ddfb60f557bc03ba2a1c38eb
  • 0e3...557 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/initialize_token_manager.rs
    0e358cf66daeb1155fdc353f60edacddbd817806222cf6038a5383ebe14b8557
  • 20e...d09 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/withdraw_funds.rs
    20e6f803ee7fbe5f045ef0ad3f8a9870834301f1a8b83ca9bcbe9c88d2f05d09
  • 25a...106 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/mint.rs
    25a1744196f931f371a4dc694748639c4a80e7f1a31227e94199cf9877bf8106
  • bee...3da ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/initiate_update_manager_owner.rs
    bee38f766cfe5e4cf7295b246a9d3856c8c6fcde412caab0815a28cb52c5c3da
  • a1b...150 ./parity-issuance/src/instructions/update_token_manager_admin.rs
    a1b7dfda7f6450c46e3cc228c3b4bc90f2c85a5e7de0c0ee5e9b1d44b99af150

Tests

  • d48...7ee ./tests/parity-contract.ts
    d48410730bb6fee2874d31ce112217debee6713d7a01e2aacfcae8eab49797ee
  • 6a3...f3b ./tests/utils/utilts.ts
    6a3f0426ec38288da9a2cc92ffc2c006861a4e0181e5d3f9036bb692f3be7f3b

Toolset

The notes below outline the setup and steps performed in the process of this audit.

Setup

Tool Setup:

Steps taken to run the tools:

  • Installed via cargo install cargo-audit
  • Ran cargo audit

Automated Analysis

Cargo Audit

Critical Vulnerabilities

  1. curve25519-dalek (version 3.2.1)
  • Title: Timing variability in curve25519-dalek's Scalar29::sub/Scalar52::sub
  • ID: RUSTSEC-2024-0344
  • Solution: Upgrade to >=4.1.3
  1. ed25519-dalek (version 1.0.1)
  • Title: Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on ed25519-dalek
  • ID: RUSTSEC-2022-0093
  • Solution: Upgrade to >=2

Unsound Warnings

  1. borsh (versions 0.9.3 and 0.10.3)
  • Title: Parsing borsh messages with ZST which are not-copy/clone is unsound
  • ID: RUSTSEC-2023-0033
  1. ouroboros (version 0.15.6)
  • Title: Ouroboros is Unsound
  • ID: RUSTSEC-2023-0042

Unmaintained Packages

  1. ansi_term (version 0.12.1)
  • Title: ansi_term is Unmaintained
  • ID: RUSTSEC-2021-0139
  1. proc-macro-error (version 1.0.4)

  • Title: proc-macro-error is unmaintained

  • ID: RUSTSEC-2024-0370

    Other Issues

  1. atty (version 0.2.14)
  • Title: Potential unaligned read
  • ID: RUSTSEC-2021-0145


Summary

The cargo audit revealed two critical vulnerabilities, two packages with unsound warnings, two unmaintained packages, and one package with a potential unaligned read issue. It is strongly recommended to address these issues, particularly the critical vulnerabilities, by upgrading the affected packages to their suggested versions or finding alternative solutions.

Test Suite Results

  parity-contract
Created USDC:  4wiCJqtotDKdizx5hxkhEyk4cbMnKFRZ9HyveGbARqMp
    parity-issuance
      ✔ Token manager is initialized!
      ✔ pUSD can be minted for USDC (13441ms)
    Parity-staking
      Parity staking Tests
        ✔ Stake Pool is initialized!
        ✔ baseMint can be staked for xMint (13443ms)
        ✔ baseMint can be unstaked by redeeming xMint (13429ms)
        ✔ should allow admin to withdraw excess tokens (40320ms)
    Pt-staking
      Pt-staking Tests
        ✔ Global Config is initialized
        ✔ baseMint can be staked in PT Staking (26897ms)
        ✔ baseMint can be unstaked in PT Staking (26883ms)
        ✔ should allow admin to withdraw excess tokens in PT Staking (40329ms)


  10 passing (4m)


 Running unittests src/lib.rs (/home/ubuntu/workspaces/parity-contracts/target/debug/deps/parity_issuance-b57c4c81e6c17ed9)

running 5 tests
test state::tests::test_calculate_max_withdrawable_amount ... ok
test state::tests::test_calculate_normalized_quantity ... ok
test state::tests::test_calculate_quote_amount ... ok
test state::tests::test_check_excessive_deposit ... ok
test test_id ... ok

test result: ok. 5 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.00s

Running unittests src/lib.rs (/home/ubuntu/workspaces/parity-contracts/target/debug/deps/parity_staking-1c2e7ea68ddc20dd)

running 11 tests
test state::tests::test_calculate_amount_to_mint ... ok
test state::tests::test_calculate_exchange_rate ... ok
test state::tests::test_calculate_normalized_quantity ... ok
test state::tests::test_calculate_output_amount ... ok
test state::tests::test_check_excessive_deposit ... ok
test test_id ... ok
test u64x64_math::tests::test_pow_large_base ... ok
test u64x64_math::tests::test_pow_overflow_exponent ... ok
test u64x64_math::tests::test_pow_positive_exponent ... ok
test u64x64_math::tests::test_pow_positive_exponent ... ok
test u64x64_math::tests::test_pow_zero_exponent ... ok

test result: ok. 11 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.00s

 Running unittests src/lib.rs (/home/ubuntu/workspaces/parity-contracts/target/debug/deps/pt_staking-bc58238573dc838f)

running 13 tests
test state::tests::test_calculate_points ... ok
test state::tests::test_calculate_points_with_multiple_changes ... ok
test state::tests::test_calculate_points_with_phases ... ok
test state::tests::test_calculate_points_with_yield_change ... ok
test state::tests::test_check_excessive_deposit ... ok
test state::tests::test_get_current_exchange_rate ... ok
test state::tests::test_global_config_update_global_points ... ok
test state::tests::test_initialize_global_config ... ok
test state::tests::test_initialize_user_stake ... ok
test state::tests::test_update_global_config ... ok
test state::tests::test_update_user_stake ... ok
test state::tests::test_user_stake_update_points_history ... ok
test test_id ... ok

test result: ok. 13 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.00s

Changelog

  • 2024-09-11 - Initial report
  • 2024-09-27 - Final report

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