



July 28th 2021 – Quantstamp Verified

API3

This smart contract audit was prepared by Quantstamp, the leader in blockchain security.

Executive Summary

Type	Staking Pool and DAO						
Auditors	Fayçal Lalidji, Security Auditor Ed Zulkoski, Senior Security Engineer Jose Ignacio Orlicki, Senior Engineer						
Timeline	2021-05-03 through 2021-06-18						
EVM	Muir Glacier						
Languages	Solidity						
Methods	Architecture Review, Unit Testing, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review						
Specification	README.md						
Documentation Quality	<div><div></div>High</div>						
Test Quality	<div><div></div>High</div>						
Source Code	<table><tr><th>Repository</th><th>Commit</th></tr><tr><td>api3-dao (283e6ba)</td><td>283e6ba</td></tr><tr><td>api3-dao (d3db4e7)</td><td>d3db4e7</td></tr></table>	Repository	Commit	api3-dao (283e6ba)	283e6ba	api3-dao (d3db4e7)	d3db4e7
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api3-dao (283e6ba)	283e6ba						
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High Risk	The issue puts a large number of users’ sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for client’s reputation or serious financial implications for client and users.
Medium Risk	The issue puts a subset of users’ sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental for the client’s reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
Low Risk	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low-impact in view of the client’s business circumstances.
Informational	The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
Undetermined	The impact of the issue is uncertain.

Total Issues	9 (9 Resolved)
High Risk Issues	1 (1 Resolved)
Medium Risk Issues	1 (1 Resolved)
Low Risk Issues	2 (2 Resolved)
Informational Risk Issues	3 (3 Resolved)
Undetermined Risk Issues	2 (2 Resolved)



Unresolved	Acknowledged the existence of the risk, and decided to accept it without engaging in special efforts to control it.
Acknowledged	The issue remains in the code but is a result of an intentional business or design decision. As such, it is supposed to be addressed outside the programmatic means, such as: 1) comments, documentation, README, FAQ; 2) business processes; 3) analyses showing that the issue shall have no negative consequences in practice (e.g., gas analysis, deployment settings).
Resolved	Adjusted program implementation, requirements or constraints to eliminate the risk.
Mitigated	Implemented actions to minimize the impact or likelihood of the risk.

Summary of Findings

Initial Audit:

While the inline documentation was in general of high quality, the file `Api3Template.sol` could use more documentation. Through reviewing the code, we found **9 potential issues** of various levels of severity. We recommend addressing the findings prior to deploying the smart contracts to the main network.

Update:

All highlighted issues have been either fixed or mitigated by the API3 team.

ID	Description	Severity	Status
QSP-1	Approved Funds Can Be Exploited by Attackers	⬆️ High	Fixed
QSP-2	Gas Usage / <code>for</code> Loop Concerns	⬆️ Medium	Mitigated
QSP-3	<code>updateCheckpointArray</code> may be susceptible to griefing	⬇️ Low	Fixed
QSP-4	Race Condition on <code>setDaoApps()</code>	⬇️ Low	Fixed
QSP-5	Unchecked function arguments	🕒 Informational	Fixed
QSP-6	Undocumented Constants	🕒 Informational	Fixed
QSP-7	Privileged Roles and Ownership	🕒 Informational	Fixed
QSP-8	Off-by-One Error in <code>updateCheckpointArray</code>	❓ Undetermined	Fixed
QSP-9	Unclear Condition	❓ Undetermined	Fixed

Quantstamp Audit Breakdown

Quantstamp's objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices.

Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Mishandled exceptions and call stack limits
- Unsafe external calls
- Integer overflow / underflow
- Number rounding errors
- Reentrancy and cross-function vulnerabilities
- Denial of service / logical oversights
- Access control
- Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting

Methodology

The Quantstamp auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following
 - i. Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii. Symbolic execution, which is analyzing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, and actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Toolset

The notes below outline the setup and steps performed in the process of this audit.

Setup

Tool Setup:

- [Slither](#) v0.7.1
- [Mythril](#) v0.22.19

Steps taken to run the tools:

1. Installed the Slither tool: `pip install slither-analyzer`
2. Run Slither from the project directory: `slither .`
3. Installed the Mythril tool from Pypi: `pip3 install mythril`
4. Ran the Mythril tool on each contract: `myth -x path/to/contract`

Findings

QSP-1 Approved Funds Can Be Exploited by Attackers

Severity: *High Risk*

Status: Fixed

Description: The funds approved to the `Api3Pool` can be withdrawn by an attacker using `TimelockUtils.depositWithVesting` and `TimelockUtils.updateTimelockStatus`. This issue is due to allowing the `msg.sender` in `TimelockUtils.depositWithVesting` to input any value for `source` address while not restricting the function access to only the the timelock manager address. Similarly, the `msg.sender` is free to input any value for `timelockManagerAddress` input in `TimelockUtils.updateTimelockStatus` function.

Exploit Scenario:

1. Alice approve all her funds to be spent by `Api3Pool` (please note that even when approving only the amount to be staked, Alice still runs the risk to be front-runned following the same scenario).
2. Bob the attacker calls `TimelockUtils.depositWithVesting` while setting the `source` address to Alice's address and the `userAddress` to its own address. This step allows Bob to transfer Alice's fund to its own balance in `Api3Pool`.
3. After the `releaseStart`, Bob calls `TimelockUtils.updateTimelockStatus` with both `userAddress` and `timelockManagerAddress` set to its own address. This step allows Bob to vest his deposited amount in step 2.
4. Bob calls `TransferUtils.withdraw` to transfer the stolen funds to its own wallet.

Recommendation:

We recommend to:

1. Restrict the `TimelockUtils.depositWithVesting` function calls to only allow the timelock manager address.
2. Remove `timelockManagerAddress` from `TimelockUtils.updateTimelockStatus` and use state variable that saves the timelock manager address instead.

QSP-2 Gas Usage / `for` Loop Concerns

Severity: *Medium Risk*

Status: Mitigated

File(s) affected: `GetterUtils.sol`

Description: Gas usage is a main concern for smart contract developers and users, since high gas costs may prevent users from wanting to use the smart contract. Even worse, some gas usage issues may prevent the contract from providing services entirely. For example, if a `for` loop requires too much gas to exit, then it may prevent the contract from functioning correctly entirely. Affected functions:

1. `GetterUtils.userDelegateAt`.
2. `GetterUtils.getUserLocked`.
3. `GetterUtils.getValueAt`.

Recommendation:

1. We recommend to implement the same binary search algorithm as implemented in `GetterUtils.userSharesAtWithBinarySearch`.
2. It is best to break such loops into individual functions as possible.
3. We recommend to implement the same binary search algorithm as implemented in `GetterUtils.userSharesAtWithBinarySearch`.

Update: Team answer: "All linear searches are replaced with binary searches except `getUserLocked()` because for the majority of the users (which will stake once and remain staked for long duration) the current implementation is extremely more gas-efficient compared to the alternatives. However, the current implementation disables users from withdrawing if they have made a lot of staking updates in the last year (more than 50 per week according to tests). As a solution, an additional `withdrawPrecalculated()` method is implemented to allow such users to withdraw their funds by making multiple transactions (note that we don't consider this as normal user flow, it's a fail-safe). This makes `MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY` unnecessary, which is why it's removed. Finally, the delegate address checkpoint array is kept in a naive way (doesn't overwrite if there hasn't been a new proposal) to simplify the implementation, as the binary search allows this (and users can't update delegates frequently anyway so this wasn't providing any benefits assuming there is going to be at least a proposal a week, which means delegate checkpoints wouldn't have been overwritten anyway)."

QSP-3 `updateCheckpointArray` may be susceptible to griefing

Severity: *Low Risk*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `DelegationUtils.sol`, `StakeUtils.sol`, `StateUtils.sol`

Description: When a user stakes or unstakes tokens, `DelegationUtils.updateDelegatedVotingPower` is invoked to ensure that the user's delegate's voting power will be updated (if they exist). However, if many users also delegate to the same address, updating stake may fail due to the `MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY` check on [L523-529](#) of `updateCheckpointArray`, which in the worst case would prevent users from unstaking their tokens. This also affects the `DelegationUtils.delegateVotingPower` and `DelegationUtils. undelegateVotingPower` functions.

Exploit Scenario: Suppose address `0xAlice` has a large stake that she has delegated to `0xBob`. The malicious users creates 20 addresses and stakes `1 wei` that gets delegated to `0xBob`. This prevents `0xAlice` from unstaking until the end of the epoch, however the sybil attack can be repeated to continue griefing.

Recommendation: Revise the `updateCheckpointArray` and `getValueAt` logic, possibly using binary search.

QSP-4 Race Condition on `setDaoApps()`

Severity: *Low Risk*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `StateUtils.sol`

Description: If `setDaoApps()` is called in a different block as the `constructor` of `Api3Pool` or in a different transaction, the an attacker can front-run the transaction to insert its own to `setDaoApps()`.

Recommendation: We recommend to either document this behavior or enforce it with by adding a call to `setDaoApps()` in the the constructor of `Api3Pool`.

QSP-5 Unchecked function arguments

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `StateUtils.sol`, `Api3Template.sol`

Description: The following functions should have additional input validation. Extra checks in constructors may mitigate faulty deployments that use default arguments and could require re-deployment.

- `StateUtils.constructor` should check that `api3TokenAddress` is non-zero.
- `Api3Template.constructor` should invoke `_ensureMiniMeFactoryIsValid(_minimeTokenFactory)` to ensure that `_minimeTokenFactory` is a contract.

Recommendation: Add `require` statements to each function.

QSP-6 Undocumented Constants

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `Api3Template.sol`

Description: The two `API3_VOTING_APP_ID` constants on L9-10 do not mention the strings used to derive the hashes. Therefore we cannot validate them.

Recommendation: Add documentation for the constants.

QSP-7 Privileged Roles and Ownership

Severity: *Informational*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `ClaimUtils.sol`

Description: Smart contracts will often have `owner` variables to designate the person with special privileges to make modifications to the smart contract. Following the inline documentation in `ClaimUtils.sol` L15, `payOutClaim()` can be "called by a claims manager to pay out an insurance claim".

Recommendation: This centralization of power needs to be made clear to the users (should be stated in the user documentation), especially depending on the level of privilege the contract allows to the claims manager.

QSP-8 Off-by-One Error in `updateCheckpointArray`

Severity: *Undetermined*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `StateUtils.sol`

Description: In this snippet:

```
if (checkpointArray.length + 1 >= MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY)
{
    uint256 interactionTimestampMaxInteractionFrequencyAgo = snapshotBlockToTimestamp[checkpointArray[checkpointArray.length + 1 - MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY].fromBlock];
    require(
        block.timestamp - interactionTimestampMaxInteractionFrequencyAgo > EPOCH_LENGTH,
        ERROR_FREQUENCY
    );
}
```

For example, if `MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY` is set to 20, this seems to only allow 19 entries.

Recommendation: Change the if-conditional to `checkpointArray.length + 1 > MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY`. Change the array access `checkpointArray[checkpointArray.length + 1 - MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY]` to `checkpointArray[checkpointArray.length - MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY]`.

QSP-9 Unclear Condition

Severity: *Undetermined*

Status: Fixed

File(s) affected: `DelegationUtils.sol`

Description: In `updateDelegatedVotingPower`, we have the following ternary statement on L117-119:

```
newDelegatedTo = currentlyDelegatedTo > shares
? currentlyDelegatedTo - shares
: 0;
```

It is not clear if `currentlyDelegatedTo > shares` can ever return false.

Recommendation: If the condition can never fail, the statement should be simplified. If not, inline documentation should explain when this could occur.

Automated Analyses

Slither

- 1. Slither reported several potentially dangerous strict equalities oof the form `totalSharesCheckpoint2.fromBlock == block.number`, however these were used in expected ways.
- 2. In `StateUtils.setStakeTarget`, the requirement `_stakeTarget >= 0` is redundant and can be removed as the variable is a `uint256`.
- 3. In several function (`TransferUtils.deposit`, `TransferUtils.withdraw`, `ClaimUtils.payOutClaim`, and `TimelockUtils.depositWithVesting`), the return value of the `ERC20transferandtransferFromcalls` are not checked to be true. Note that all calls are to `theApi3Token`` however.

Mythril

Mythril did not report any issues.

Code Documentation

- 1. In `GetterUtils.sol`, the comment on L10-11: "This method is used to implement the MiniMe interface for the Api3Voting app" is unclear. The [Minime Token](#) seems to support cloning and a `totalSupplyAt` function, neither of which are implemented here.
- 2. In the comment for `DelegationUtils.updateDelegatedVotingPower` on L95-96, it is stated: "User shares only get updated while staking, scheduling unstake or unstaking". However, shares are not updated when scheduling unstake (and `updateDelegatedVotingPower` is not called from `scheduleUnstake`).

Adherence to Best Practices

- 1. The literal `1_000_000_000` on `StateUtils.sol#L359` should be a declared constant. It is also not clear why this needs to be so large (equivalent to 1000% based on other constants).
- 2. In `StateUtils.sol`, the `updateCheckpointArray` has the `MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY` check, whereas `updateAddressCheckpointArray` does not. It seems this is likely to save gas since these two functions are always invoked from the same external function. However, it should be documented that `updateAddressCheckpointArray` is not safe when called on its own (i.e., without `updateCheckpointArray`).
- 3. It is mentioned on L10 of `TransferUtils.sol` that `deposit` is used by `TimelockManager.sol`. Is there any reason a user should call this function directly? If not, it should be restricted to only be callable contracts that inherit from it. Similarly, should `TimelockUtils.depositWithVesting` be restricted to only callable from `TimelockManager` contracts?
- 4. In `StakeUtils.depositAndStake`, it is unclear why `userAddress` is needed as a parameters since it is required to always equal `msg.sender`.
- 5. In `Api3Template.sol`, L9-10 define two `API3_VOTING_APP_ID` constants, where one is commented out depending on the chain used (rinkeby or mainnet). This should instead be controlled by deployment scripts.
- 6. Some variables names are to long, for example `interactionTimestampMaxInteractionFrequencyAgo`.
- 7. Document what is the initial or minimum (mea culpa) `aprUpdateCoefficient` as this parameter defines the speed of APR update and is critical.

Test Results

Test Suite Results

```
payOutClaim
  Caller is claims manager
  Pool has enough funds
    ✓ pays out claim (116ms)
  Pool does not have enough funds
    ✓ reverts (57ms)
  Caller is not claims manager
    ✓ reverts

delegateVotingPower
  Delegate address is not zero
  Delegate address is not caller
  Delegate is not delegating
    User has not updated their delegation status less than reward epoch ago
    User did not have the same delegate
    Receiving user has not been delegated to too frequently
      ✓ delegates voting power (170ms)
    Receiving user has been delegated to too frequently
      ✓ reverts (3052ms)
  User had the same delegate
    ✓ reverts (140ms)
  User has updated their delegation status less than reward epoch ago
    ✓ reverts
  Delegate is delegating
    ✓ reverts
  Delegate address is caller
    ✓ reverts
  Delegate address is zero
    ✓ reverts

undelegateVotingPower
  User has delegated before
    User has not updated their delegation status less than reward epoch ago
      ✓ undelegates voting power (155ms)
  User has updated their delegation status less than reward epoch ago
    ✓ reverts
  User has not delegated before
    ✓ reverts

totalSupplyOneBlockAgo
  ✓ gets total supply one block ago (116ms)
```

```
userSharesAt
  ✓ gets user shares at (105ms)

userSharesAtWithBinarySearch
  ✓ gets user shares at (112ms)

userReceivedDelegationAt
  Searched block is within MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY
  ✓ gets user's received delegation at the block (3212ms)
  Searched block is not within MAX_INTERACTION_FREQUENCY
  ✓ reverts (3791ms)

getDelegateAt
  ✓ gets delegate at (142ms)

getUserLocked
  It has been more than REWARD_VESTING_PERIOD since the genesis epoch
  User has staked
  ✓ returns the rewards paid to the user in the last REWARD_VESTING_PERIOD (3740ms)
  User has not staked
  ✓ returns 0 (969ms)
  It has not been more than REWARD_VESTING_PERIOD since the genesis epoch
  ✓ returns the rewards paid to the user (1168ms)

payReward
  Reward for the previous epoch has not been paid
  Pool contract is authorized to mint tokens
  Stake target is not zero
  Total stake is above target
  ✓ updates APR and pays reward (473ms)
  Total stake is below target
  ✓ updates APR and pays reward (187ms)
  Stake target is zero
  ✓ sets APR to minimum and pays reward (148ms)
  Pool contract is not authorized to mint tokens
  ✓ skips the payment and APR update (137ms)
  Rewards for multiple epochs have not been paid
  Pool contract is authorized to mint tokens
  ✓ updates APR and only pays the reward for the current epoch (174ms)
  Pool contract is not authorized to mint tokens
  ✓ skips the payment and APR update (135ms)
  Reward for the current epoch has been paid
  ✓ does nothing (167ms)

stake
  User has enough to stake
  User has a delegate and has staked before
  ✓ stakes and updates delegated voting power (145ms)
  User does not have a delegate
  ✓ stakes (68ms)
  User does not have enough to stake
  ✓ reverts

depositAndStake
  Caller is the beneficiary
  ✓ deposits and stakes (51ms)
  Caller is not the beneficiary
  ✓ reverts

scheduleUnstake
  User has enough staked to schedule unstake
  ✓ schedules unstake (69ms)
  User does not have enough staked to schedule unstake
  ✓ reverts

unstake
  Enough time has passed since the unstake scheduling
  The unstake has not expired
  User still has the tokens to unstake
  User has a delegate
  ✓ unstakes and updates delegated voting power (210ms)
  User does not have a delegate
  ✓ unstakes (142ms)
  User no longer has the tokens to unstake
  ✓ unstakes as much as possible (183ms)
  The unstake has expired
  ✓ reverts (127ms)
  Not enough time has passed since the unstake scheduling
  ✓ reverts (92ms)

unstakeAndWithdraw
  ✓ unstakes and withdraws (135ms)

constructor
  ✓ initializes with the correct parameters (112ms)

setDaoApps
  DAO apps are not set before
  DAO app addresses to be set are not zero
  ✓ sets DAO apps
  DAO app addresses to be set are zero
  ✓ reverts (45ms)
  DAO apps are set before
  Caller is primary Agent
  ✓ sets DAO apps (52ms)
  Caller is a random person
  ✓ reverts

setClaimsManagerStatus
  Caller is primary Agent
  ✓ sets claims manager status (63ms)
  Caller is not primary Agent
  ✓ reverts

setStakeTarget
  Caller is Agent
  Stake target to be set is smaller than or equal to 100,000,000
  ✓ sets stake target (65ms)
  Stake target to be set is larger than 100,000,000
  ✓ reverts
  Caller is not DAO Agent
  ✓ reverts

setMaxApr
  Caller is DAO Agent
  Max APR to be set is larger than or equal to min APR
  ✓ sets max APR (84ms)
  Max APR to be set is smaller than min APR
  ✓ reverts
  Caller is not DAO Agent
  ✓ reverts

setMinApr
  Caller is DAO Agent
  Min APR to be set is smaller than or equal to max APR
  ✓ sets min APR (67ms)
  Min APR to be set is larger than max APR
  ✓ reverts
  Caller is not DAO Agent
  ✓ reverts

setUnstakeWaitPeriod
  Caller is primary DAO Agent
  Unstake wait period to be set is larger than or equal to epoch length
  ✓ sets unstake wait period (49ms)
  Unstake wait period to be set is smaller than epoch length
  ✓ reverts (42ms)
  Caller is not primary DAO Agent
  ✓ reverts

setAprUpdateCoefficient
  Caller is DAO Agent
  APR update coefficient to be set is larger than 0 and smaller than or equal to 1,000,000,000
  ✓ sets APR update coefficient (65ms)
  APR update coefficient to be set is 0 or larger than 1,000,000,000
  ✓ reverts
  Caller is not DAO Agent
  ✓ reverts

setProposalVotingPowerThreshold
  Caller is primary DAO Agent
  Proposal voting power threshold to be set is smaller than or equal to 10,000,000
  ✓ sets proposal voting power threshold (56ms)
  Proposal voting power threshold to be set is larger than 10,000,000
  ✓ reverts
  Caller is not primary DAO Agent
  ✓ reverts

publishSpecsUrl
  ✓ publishes specs URL

updateLastVoteSnapshotBlock
  Caller is a Voting app
  ✓ updates lastVoteSnapshotBlock (49ms)
  Caller is not an authorized Api3Voting app
  ✓ reverts
```



```
depositWithVesting
  User has not received from this timelock manager
  Release end is later than release start
  Amount is not zero
    ✓ deposits with vesting (46ms)
  Amount is zero
    ✓ reverts
  Release end is not later than release start
    ✓ reverts
  User has received from this timelock manager before
    ✓ reverts (68ms)

updateTimelockStatus
  Timelock has started releasing
  Timelock has remaining tokens
    It is past release end
      ✓ updates timelock status (63ms)
    It is not past release end
      ✓ updates timelock status (169ms)
  Timelock does not have remaining tokens
    ✓ reverts (69ms)
  Timelock has not started releasing
    ✓ reverts (55ms)

deposit
  ✓ deposits

withdraw
  User has enough withdrawable funds
    ✓ updates user locked and withdraws (2701ms)
  User does not have enough withdrawable funds
    ✓ reverts (73ms)
  User does not have enough funds
    ✓ reverts

82 passing (4m)

api3-voting$ npm run test

Contract: API3 Voting App delegation tests
Solidity stack traces only work with Solidity version 0.5.1 or higher.
  delegation for the voting working properly
    ✓ delegate to myself or to 0 address (63ms)
    ✓ need to delegate (243ms)
    ✓ delegate after already delegated
    ✓ undo delegate earlier then after a week
    ✓ undo delegate (170ms)
    ✓ delegate delegated (170ms)
    ✓ delegate delegated in a cycle (97ms)

Contract: API3 Voting App
normal token supply, common tests
  ✓ fails on reinitialization
  ✓ cannot initialize base app (55ms)
  ✓ checks it is forwarder
  ✓ can change required support (39ms)
  ✓ fails changing required support lower than minimum acceptance quorum (45ms)
  ✓ fails changing required support to 100% or more (98ms)
  ✓ can change minimum acceptance quorum (39ms)
  ✓ fails changing minimum acceptance quorum to greater than min support
normal token supply, 0 decimals
  ✓ deciding voting is automatically executed (57ms)
  ✓ deciding voting is automatically executed (long version) (42ms)
  ✓ execution scripts can execute multiple actions (57ms)
  ✓ execution script can be empty (45ms)
  ✓ execution throws if any action on script throws (85ms)
  ✓ forwarding creates vote (50ms)
creating vote
  ✓ has correct state
  ✓ fails getting a vote out of bounds
  ✓ changing required support does not affect vote required support (124ms)
  ✓ changing min quorum doesnt affect vote min quorum (96ms)
  ✓ holder can vote (42ms)
  ✓ holder can modify vote (77ms)
  ✓ token transfers dont affect voting (47ms)
  ✓ throws when non-holder votes
  ✓ throws when voting after voting closes
  ✓ can execute if vote is approved with support and quorum (101ms)
  ✓ cannot execute vote if not enough quorum met (63ms)
  ✓ cannot execute vote if not support met (95ms)
  ✓ vote can be executed automatically if decided (53ms)
  ✓ vote can be not executed automatically if decided (64ms)
  ✓ cannot re-execute vote (82ms)
  ✓ cannot vote on executed vote (68ms)
normal token supply, 2 decimals
  ✓ deciding voting is automatically executed (80ms)
  ✓ deciding voting is automatically executed (long version) (64ms)
  ✓ execution scripts can execute multiple actions (79ms)
  ✓ execution script can be empty (71ms)
  ✓ execution throws if any action on script throws (135ms)
  ✓ forwarding creates vote (59ms)
creating vote
  ✓ has correct state (43ms)
  ✓ fails getting a vote out of bounds
  ✓ changing required support does not affect vote required support (234ms)
  ✓ changing min quorum doesnt affect vote min quorum (127ms)
  ✓ holder can vote (64ms)
  ✓ holder can modify vote (119ms)
  ✓ token transfers dont affect voting (85ms)
  ✓ throws when non-holder votes (41ms)
  ✓ throws when voting after voting closes (56ms)
  ✓ can execute if vote is approved with support and quorum (131ms)
  ✓ cannot execute vote if not enough quorum met (94ms)
  ✓ cannot execute vote if not support met (94ms)
  ✓ vote can be executed automatically if decided (52ms)
  ✓ vote can be not executed automatically if decided (69ms)
  ✓ cannot re-execute vote (69ms)
  ✓ cannot vote on executed vote (68ms)
normal token supply, 18 decimals
  ✓ deciding voting is automatically executed (72ms)
  ✓ deciding voting is automatically executed (long version) (59ms)
  ✓ execution scripts can execute multiple actions (81ms)
  ✓ execution script can be empty (58ms)
  ✓ execution throws if any action on script throws (140ms)
  ✓ forwarding creates vote (66ms)
creating vote
  ✓ has correct state
  ✓ fails getting a vote out of bounds
  ✓ changing required support does not affect vote required support (180ms)
  ✓ changing min quorum doesnt affect vote min quorum (122ms)
  ✓ holder can vote (65ms)
  ✓ holder can modify vote (110ms)
  ✓ token transfers dont affect voting (68ms)
  ✓ throws when non-holder votes (40ms)
  ✓ throws when voting after voting closes (41ms)
  ✓ can execute if vote is approved with support and quorum (113ms)
  ✓ cannot execute vote if not enough quorum met (62ms)
  ✓ cannot execute vote if not support met (85ms)
  ✓ vote can be executed automatically if decided (48ms)
  ✓ vote can be not executed automatically if decided (73ms)
  ✓ cannot re-execute vote (68ms)
  ✓ cannot vote on executed vote (102ms)
normal token supply, 26 decimals
  ✓ deciding voting is automatically executed (84ms)
  ✓ deciding voting is automatically executed (long version) (84ms)
  ✓ execution scripts can execute multiple actions (90ms)
  ✓ execution script can be empty (64ms)
  ✓ execution throws if any action on script throws (201ms)
  ✓ forwarding creates vote (109ms)
creating vote
  ✓ has correct state
  ✓ fails getting a vote out of bounds
  ✓ changing required support does not affect vote required support (165ms)
  ✓ changing min quorum doesnt affect vote min quorum (129ms)
  ✓ holder can vote (65ms)
  ✓ holder can modify vote (103ms)
  ✓ token transfers dont affect voting (68ms)
  ✓ throws when non-holder votes (58ms)
  ✓ throws when voting after voting closes (63ms)
  ✓ can execute if vote is approved with support and quorum (156ms)
  ✓ cannot execute vote if not enough quorum met (84ms)
  ✓ cannot execute vote if not support met (91ms)
  ✓ vote can be executed automatically if decided (52ms)
  ✓ vote can be not executed automatically if decided (69ms)
  ✓ cannot re-execute vote (98ms)
  ✓ cannot vote on executed vote (79ms)
wrong initializations
  ✓ fails if min acceptance quorum is greater than min support
  ✓ fails if min support is 100% or more (57ms)
empty token
  ✓ fails creating a vote if token has no holder (63ms)
token supply = 1
  ✓ new vote cannot be executed before voting (108ms)
new vote parameters
```

```
    ✓ creating vote as holder executes vote (if _canExecute param says so) (85ms)
    ✓ creating vote as holder doesn't execute vote if _canExecute param doesn't says so (80ms)
token supply = 3
    ✓ new vote cannot be executed before holder2 voting (181ms)
    ✓ creating vote as holder2 executes vote (92ms)
changing token supply
    ✓ uses the correct snapshot value if tokens are minted afterwards (76ms)
    ✓ uses the correct snapshot value if tokens are minted in the same block (79ms)
before init
    ✓ fails creating a vote before initialization
    ✓ fails to forward actions before initialization
isValuePct unit test
    ✓ tests total = 0
    ✓ tests value = 0
    ✓ tests pct ~= 100
    ✓ tests strict inequality
```

119 passing (2m)

Code Coverage

cd pool/ & npm run test:coverage

File	% Stmts	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
contracts/	100	100	100	100	
Api3Pool.sol	100	100	100	100	
ClaimUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
DelegationUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
GetterUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
RewardUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
StakeUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
StateUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
TimelockUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
TransferUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/auxiliary/interfaces/	100	100	100	100	
IApi3Pool.sol	100	100	100	100	
IApi3Token.sol	100	100	100	100	
ITimelockManager.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/auxiliary/interfaces/v0.8.2/	100	100	100	100	
IApi3Token.sol	100	100	100	100	
IERC20.sol	100	100	100	100	
ITimelockManager.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/interfaces/	100	100	100	100	
IApi3Pool.sol	100	100	100	100	
IClaimUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
IDelegationUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
IGetterUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
IRewardUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
IStakeUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
IStateUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
ITimelockUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
ITransferUtils.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/mock/	100	100	100	100	
MockApi3Staker.sol	100	100	100	100	
MockApi3Voting.sol	100	100	100	100	
All files	100	100	100	100	

cd api3-voting/ & npm run coverage

File	% Stmts	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
contracts/	97.96	95.65	91.3	97.96	
Api3Voting.sol	97.96	95.65	91.3	97.96	154,216
contracts/interfaces/	100	100	100	100	
IApi3Pool.sol	100	100	100	100	
All files	97.96	95.65	91.3	97.96	

Appendix

File Signatures

The following are the SHA-256 hashes of the reviewed files. A file with a different SHA-256 hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. You are cautioned that a different SHA-256 hash could be (but is not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of the review.

Contracts

adcfa08eb5348d3c05244ea53a493d122f0d26fc060fddcfea275098f0fe2ee3 ./Api3Template.sol

8138006671e707b007e7af7e4a3039532b72835d416d473933448512cd9cb3ed ./Api3Voting.sol

32eee74c77361eba3f58a94a7b58ba13d91d1c5338cd81401d1cc3fa76daf7f6 ./contracts/GetterUtils.sol

8cbc970457796ce6fbc70333862261c39217b5a86565fa609e18e7da9d09a21f ./contracts/TransferUtils.sol

e2d70e8f646070d54ee6ab28216733def0483ef855b17e92324c866e8e0ca749 ./contracts/StakeUtils.sol

678030af6afa7474836bd5f6fec3ee784941a4e3df2e5f0ab51ccc78cb81ff22 ./contracts/Api3Pool.sol

c384dce5ac5a9dac3c224841c577d1561a5f31fe897999acb5197ebd96b80b03 ./contracts/DelegationUtils.sol

ca58d3a279b934293788cf0fa2c987769b10d7ee529bf532b48faeb5838f19f4 ./contracts/TimelockUtils.sol

398592d423b9eb1b5051303d6ff29220e499840485c87c29f347fce3558d33d9 ./contracts/ClaimUtils.sol

b624b27216e0cace4804ad70aea88bff46da5238487c51827577cb1566f9590a ./contracts/StateUtils.sol

5956d48673d4c917c6a6a1d42fbdacfedb7ddd0fcefb9a99e4c8ab540f3317c5 ./contracts/RewardUtils.sol

8955d658abbc7fc99c954486e98b80e82159f2c538a8f85f0e5373a83200eb68 ./contracts/interfaces/IStateUtils.sol

5fb49bf8ff93c8eebcc3bcc2e6bf6be9eace90aab290a469a5b29c1644283101 ./contracts/interfaces/ITransferUtils.sol

32b242eacd40a12808f8b5404d616ac34a75dd0a7b77ab6d2ee2d050e755776a ./contracts/interfaces/ISTakeUtils.sol

df2aa0a1500da7b79794de9740f7fa17c2adfa3d11cf0d82de2cb030d61cce51 ./contracts/interfaces/IApi3Pool.sol

33bc2e85777d27427ea375b7a7ed3a5070b89d6980589fec3d0a0e9f74d6aa79 ./contracts/interfaces/ITimelockUtils.sol

91a9fd3bbd620eac79684d48bdfa1953d67083e691c815845ea0b04db313c502 ./contracts/interfaces/IDelegationUtils.sol

926fec1ecbec1d0e521837209e1b14d98450c5bb8bb0330b38d58006c8bf66b2 ./contracts/interfaces/IRewardUtils.sol

b331158ded472ef51d27078d034a1f8c5b34177da4d77355271c2aceaf7b43b5 ./contracts/interfaces/IGetterUtils.sol

b747cd98f0cb1a11f9c424f8f21a105093e4cd12c219b2e7a4ab6d33b4f53f9f ./contracts/interfaces/IClaimUtils.sol

Tests

ae31e818e49ccd602fc8cbdf62337c5e06fe7bf0595ff235b0bf0bfa7f7cbaa2 ./api3template.js

624ce605cc55e321b8c4066f61015ee4ce225111c0660eb73ea1add276bd7804 ./voting.js

c6aee5753d46b96297210a61aaa5e362a40f6d1341d9da68c76befea622c610b ./delegation-integration.js

5dda8ffa80edb2bd970683edc7389f981488a28468a679a886065e176d0ff5a3 ./errors.js

d2ba2048b478df1eb4864e105c70eb4f3f66a5037513a9c641ecd93b1b20d29c ./test/DelegationUtils.sol.js

d7166ab8d2095f3e29cdf4db7f666aff104a34f81238a7f8788402dc03eff42b ./test/TransferUtils.sol.js

6cdef3b4abc62be9f984112ac0fbd01f12ee81f4f4dccc349fbfb2ad42817706 ./test/ClaimUtils.sol.js

c380164a0b5b52c2fa6965b3c8d31b1b8c0608496a210de9cd9be672239ee677 ./test/RewardUtils.sol.js

62530c0fc1ab4e58ffb7ff4a6f5e42670de8de8c3fd913e63e01b7038d6a80e9 ./test/StakeUtils.sol.js

ab3d68d53c8e58f5fb0cd8b2b4eb451ff01e52611c49c4fb1704f95e1766a536 ./test/StateUtils.sol.js

3f3f0c189a11dd375d03761dc7c486a941cd749c3009ec6b4892ed26f4ad1fca ./test/GetterUtils.sol.js

935163bbcfad488df062584e05f96984afcb8e2fcdcbce23120b09d8e0071260f ./test/TimelockUtils.sol.js

Changelog

- 2021-05-18 - Initial report
- 2021-06-18 - Re-audit (d3db4e7)

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Quantstamp is a Y Combinator-backed company that helps to secure blockchain platforms at scale using computer-aided reasoning tools, with a mission to help boost the adoption of this exponentially growing technology.

With over 1000 Google scholar citations and numerous published papers, Quantstamp's team has decades of combined experience in formal verification, static analysis, and software verification. Quantstamp has also developed a protocol to help smart contract developers and projects worldwide to perform cost-effective smart contract security scans.

To date, Quantstamp has protected \$5B in digital asset risk from hackers and assisted dozens of blockchain projects globally through its white glove security assessment services. As an evangelist of the blockchain ecosystem, Quantstamp assists core infrastructure projects and leading community initiatives such as the Ethereum Community Fund to expedite the adoption of blockchain technology.

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